中文摘要：

从厂商污染治理技术创新信息外溢的视角，以创新信息的外溢度作为模型的内生变量，以降低污染治理的成本作为厂商污染治理技术投资的动力，并应用两阶段动态博弈方法，分析了寡头垄断厂商在不合作和合作进行污染治理的技术创新情况下的最优创新投入以及最优产出和最大利润问题，在此基础上，探讨了厂商的最优污染治理技术创新策略。研究结果表明：在合作时，厂商的最优治污技术投资更多。而且投资效率更高，产量也更高，同时能获得更多长期利润。

英文摘要：

Assuming that manufacturers＇ investment in pollution abatement technology is to reduce the cost of pollution control, and taking the degree of information spillovers as a endogenous variable, we set up a dynamic game model of oligopoly＇s technological innovation around the pollution control. The results show that when firms cooperate in innovation, the total investment, the outputs and the profit are more than that when firms are non-cooperative, and the profits are of long-term.