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中文摘要：
基于赢者通吃和信息不完全的假设，建立了削减量信息不完全下，双寡头厂商治污技术投资期权博弈模型，并进行了数值模拟。研究表明，厂商的博弈均衡存在且唯一，对称厂商的均衡结果为同时均衡；不对称厂商的均衡结果可能为序贯均衡、抢先均衡或同时均衡。
英文摘要：
Under the assumptions of winner-takes-all and incomplete information, the option game model of pollution abatement technology investment for Symmetric duopoly with incomplete of pollution dis- charge reduction is constructed and numerically studied. The results show that there exists a unique equi- librium in the game. The equilibrium of symmetric duopoly is a collusive equilibrium, while the equilibri- um of asymmetric duopoly may be preemption, sequential or collusive equilibrium.
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