文章基于微分博弈原理,分析在碳排放标准政策下,南北国家基于福利最大化的占优策略均衡。研究发现,在气候政策对称时,执行相同严格程度的碳排放标准政策对南方国家来说是相对不公平的。运用HJB方程求得静态线性马尔科夫完美纳什均衡,结果显示,基于福利最大化,均衡情况下的策略选择应该是北方国家比南方国家实施更为严格的碳排放标准政策。并且,对于给定的碳排放水平S,降低南方国家的碳减排成本有利于全球福利的增加。
Based on differential game theory and under the condition of carbon emissions standard policy, this paper analyzes the dominant strategy equilibrium of the two countries (South and North) under the welfare maximization. This study shows that when the climate policy is symmetrical, adapting the same level of carbon emission standard is relatively not fair for the South. By using the HJB equation, there is a static linear Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, which shows that based on welfare maximization hypothesis; the equilibrium strategy choice is that the north should implement a stricter emissions standard than the south. And for a given level of carbon emission, S, reducing the carbon reduction cost of the south is conducive to the increase of the global welfare.