中文摘要：

考虑传统零售渠道销售产生的碳排放成本和生产商投资碳减排，构建了一个生产商主导的双渠道低碳供应链博弈模型，求解得到不同渠道结构下的最优解。结论表明：消费者对零售渠道的低忠诚度是生产商选择双渠道供应链的前提；传统零售渠道销售单位产品的碳排放成本决定双渠道供应链能否存在，碳排放成本越高，供应链总减排量和单位产品碳减排量越低；提出并检验了“成本共担契约＋收益共享契约”，当成本共担因子和收益共享因子较高时容易实现供应链协调，具体则由双方的谈判力量决定。

英文摘要：

Taking the carbon emission cost in retail channel and manufacturer＇s investment effort to reduce carbon emission into consideration, a dual-channel low-carbon supply chain game model dominated by the manufacturer is built, the optimal decision variable values under different channel structures are obtained. Conclusions illustrate that consumers＇ low loyalty to retail channel is the precondition of manufacturer to use dual-channel supply chain. The carbon emission cost in retail chan- nel decides whether the dual-channel supply exists or not, both the gross carbon emission reduction and carbon emission re- duction of unit product decrease as the carbon emission cost in retail channel increases. It addresses and examines the ＂cost sharing ＋ revenue sharing＂ contract, results illustrate that high sharing portions can coordinate the supply chain easily, but the specific values should be negotiated by manufacturer and retailer.