中文摘要：

为了探究中央政府碳税政策下地方政府补贴决策与企业减排决策的互动关系,本文构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法求解三者间的博弈均衡解,分析各自的最优决策及影响因素。研究发现,中央政府的最优决策为碳税收入中自留部分不宜超过6/7成,其余的尽可能返还给地方政府。地方政府的最优补贴策略应对减排困难达到一定程度的企业才提供补贴。企业的最优减排决策取决于自身减排难度,而不依赖于地方政府的减排补贴。建议政府建立灵活的财政转移支付制度来缓解统一碳税和区域经济发展不平衡的矛盾;在统一碳税税率的前提下根据行业减排难度,灵活调整返还比例和补贴数额,照顾重点排污企业;循序渐进地使用专项补贴,促进企业研发和应用环保技术。

英文摘要：

In order to explore the interactive relationship between the local government＇s decision on subsidies and corporate decision on emission reduction under central government carbon tax policy, this paper constructs a three-stage dynamic game model, acquire the game equilibrium solution by backward induction method to discuss their optimum decision-making strategy and impact factors. It is found that the central government＇s carbon tax return proportion should be below six-seventh, and the remainder should be returned to the local government as much as possible. The local government＇s optimum strategy is to provide carbon emission reduction subsidies only when the enterprise＇s emission reduction difficulty reaches at some ex- tent, and the enterprise＇s optimum emission reduction strategy is dependent on its emission reduction difficulty instead of the local government＇s emission reduction subsides. It is suggested that the government shall ease the contradiction be- tween the unified carbon taxation rate and the unbalanced regional development by setting up the flexible transfer payment system, adjusting the incoming carbon return proportion and subsidies amount according to industry emission reduction status under the premise of unified carbon taxation rate. Thus the key pollution firms shall be treated preferentially so as to avoid over much quantity loss, push up the firm to go on with R＆D and application of environment protection technology.