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南北碳排放配额政策博弈分析与策略选择
  • ISSN号:1007-9807
  • 期刊名称:《管理科学学报》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:X01[环境科学与工程] X22[环境科学与工程—环境科学]
  • 作者机构:[1]暨南大学资源环境与可持续发展研究所,广州510632, [2]暨南大学经济学院,广州510632, [3]广东金融学院工商管理系,广州510521
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273114).
中文摘要:

在回顾碳减排政策演变的基础上,基于双变量(贸易比较优势和环境比较优势)、碳排放配额政策和不完全市场竞争假设,构建了两阶段的政府碳排放配额政策与企业碳减排水平选择的博弈模型,应用逆向求解法得到了均衡解;进而考虑激励相容条件和参与约束条件,得到全局稳定均衡最优解及其条件,从福利、贸易、环境效应等多个角度分析比较了南北国家碳排放许可证政策、碳排放配额许可交易政策和许可交易碳排放权合作政策的选择条件.结果表明:从改善福利来看,碳排放配额许可交易市场能够促进资源在国家间的有效配置、实现Pareto改进;从改善环境来看,许可交易碳排放权合作政策最好,碳排放许可证政策最差;从改善贸易来看,三种政策难分伯仲,但许可交易碳排放权合作政策更有利于北方国家,碳排放配额许可交易政策更有利于南方国家.三种政策均不可能实现环境和贸易同时改善,短期内南方国家仍会优先选择碳排放配额许可交易政策,发达国家试图短期内实现全球环境政策合作还不够现实,应本着更为务实的原则积极稳妥、循序渐进的方式来推进环境合作.

英文摘要:

By reviewing the evolution of carbon emission abatement policies, this paper presents a two-stage game for the interaction between government carbon emission permits policies and firms' abatement level and obtains the equilibrium solution, which is based on the assumptions among double variables( trade comparative advantage and environment comparative advantage), carbon emission quota policies and imperfectly competi- tive conditions. Using the way of backward induction, we first obtain the equilibrium solution and then get the optimal general steady equilibrium solution considering both the incentive compatibility constraint and the indi- vidual rationality constraint. This paper analyses, compares and derives the conditions of policy choices, from the angles of welfare effect, trade effect and environment effect, among the three different permits policies of North-South country (named non-tradable carbon permits policy, tradable carbon permits policy, and coopera- tive and tradable carbon permits policy respectively). The results show that: From the view of welfare im- provement, the permits market would promote effective allocation of resources and leads to a Pareto improve- ment. In terms of environment improvement, environment effect weights most with cooperative and tradable carbon permits policy, least with non-tradable carbon permits policy. When considering trade improvement, three policies are equally prosperous, except that the cooperative and tradable permits policy is more favorable for the north while tradable permits are preferred by the south. All the three policies could not fulfill environment and trade improvement at the same time. Thus, in the short term, the south will give preference to the tradable permits policy. It's unpractical for developed countries to achieve global environmental cooperation in a short time. Following a more pragmatic principle and taking the active and steady way, realizing cooperation step by step is a better choice for developed country.

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期刊信息
  • 《管理科学学报》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:国家自然科学基金委员会
  • 主办单位:国家自然科学基金委员会管理科学部
  • 主编:郭重庆
  • 地址:天津大学25教学楼A区908室
  • 邮编:300072
  • 邮箱:jmstju@263.net
  • 电话:022-27403197
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1007-9807
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:12-1275/G3
  • 邮发代号:6-89
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 日本日本科学技术振兴机构数据库,中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国中国科技核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2004版),中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版)
  • 被引量:22041