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中文摘要：
本文通过对基金市场中基金管理者和市场监管者的行为分析，引入有限理性博弈概念．建立了一个基金市场监管问题的动态博弈模型，并应用进化博弈方法在模型求解和参数分析的基础上提出了相关政策建议。
英文摘要：
This paper introduces the concept of bounded rationality game theory and establishes a dynamic game theory model of fund market supervision. This paper explores possible solutions to the model and conducts variable analysis correspondingly. In the end, normative research results and suggestions are given regarding policy-making in fund market supervision.
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