中文摘要：

管制介于市场与政府间，实质是资源配置利益的事前调整。本文建立了管制机构放松管制的多维度效用函数，并利用二阶段动态博弈模型分析了效用函数各个组成部分在放松管制进程中对管制机构产生的长期与短期不同影响。研究发现：国有资产的保值与增值目标是短期妨碍管制放松的原因；而预算规模目标在长期与短期都将受到管制放松的不利影响。因而，在短期，管制政策设计必须弱化国有资产的保值与增值动机．而在长期．管制政策必须在管制机构与公共利益之间建立起激励相密机制。

英文摘要：

Regulatory institution is one of the most important interests group and its participation and support is essential to the regulation reform. This paper mainly to research the characteristics of regulatiory institution in china and to establishe a dynamic game model to analyze the reason of hindrance in deregulation process.We withdraw some theorems from aboved analysis.We argued that the utility of regulatiory institution wether short run or long run will be resulted with negative effeetions in deregulation process for budget section but for social welfare section. The ownship rights of state will be resulted with negative effection in short run and postive effection in long run. Thus, in the long run, in order to realize deregulation in monopoly industry, the design of regulation policy must be setted up a mechnism of incentive compatibility constrains. In short run,the performance of deregulation will be depended on suupporting of finance for regulatory institution.