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中文摘要：
中国大量企业借助技术转让推进技术创新，理清技术转让谈判要素对技术转让竞合格局的影响，研究技术转让交互策略显得尤为重要。梳理已有研究，构建纳什谈判博弈模型，基于平等主义和功利主义测度局中人支付值；引入支付让渡权和可信威胁假设，基于最小化最大值理论和差分博弈求得两种新解；基于中国奇瑞汽车公司的实际数据，验证3种均衡解的存在性，探讨其差异性根源。研究结果表明，纳什谈判博弈均衡解是功利主义原则和平等主义原则的折衷；对于引进方而言，支付让渡权及可信威胁条件下的新均衡解都优于一般均衡解，而且支付让渡权相对于可信威胁对引进方更有利；3种均衡解的差异性源于3种基础性均衡理论，3种基础性均衡理论分别适用于不同的技术转让谈判情境，并产生竞合格局的差别。研究结论有助于设计技术转让攻防策略和可信威胁，强化技术转让竞合格局，提高技术转让绩效，推动引进方技术进步。
英文摘要：
Facing the actuality that a large number Chinese enterprises poured in technology transfer negotiation so as to propeltechnology innovation, it is significant to clarify influence of negotiation elements on technology transfer coopetition pattern andstudy mutual strategy of technology transfer negotiation. Through literature review, the paper constructed Nash negotiation gamemodel and measured payoff level of players based on equality and utility principles respectively. Payoff alienation rights and de-pendable threat were introduced. Two new types of solutions were then acquired based on minimax theory and differential game.By means of investigation on Chery Automobile Co. Ltd in China as an example, the paper verified the existence of these threesolutions and discussed their differences sources. The results indicated that Nash negotiation game equilibrium solution was a syn-thesis of the two principles （ i. e. , equality and utility principles）. The new solutions were all superior to the general one fortechnology licensee under the conditions of payoff alienation rights and dependable threat. Moreover, payoff alienation rightsplayed more significant effect than dependable threat did. Differences of Nash negotiation equilibrium solutions rooted in threebasic equilibrium theories, which are applied in different technology transfer negotiation situations, and led to differences in coo-petition pattern. These conclusions could help design strategy and dependable threat of technology transfer, intensify coopetitionpattern, promote technology transfer performance, and drive technical progress of technology licensee.
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