中文摘要：

在职消费经济效应与其经济性质和公司治理强弱密切相关。中国公司在职消费具有货币薪酬补充、正常职务消费及自娱性消费三种成分，其中货币薪酬补充成分对高管具有激励作用，正常职务消费可以提升高管办事效率、降低交易成本，自娱性消费会产生代理成本。在职消费经济效应取决于前两种成分的经济效益与后一种成分的代理成本。若前者大于后者，表现为“效率观”，反之为“代理观”。公司治理是在职消费经济效应的重要影响因素．公司治理越严格．在职消费的“效率观”表现越明显。本文通过实证检验证实中国公司在职消费经济性质、经济效应及公司治理对其产生的影响发现：货币薪酬补充、正常职务消费及自娱性消费三种成分并存：总体上看，在职消费表现出较强的“效率观”，说明货币薪酬补充成分和正常职务消费占据主导地位：“股权集中度”与“机构投资者持股比例”较高的公司．在职消费表现出较强的“效率观”．而二者较低的公司在职消费与业绩不相关．说明股东与机构投资者治理对在职消费经济效应产生重要影响：“独立董事比例”高低对在职消费经济效应没有显著影响．说明独立董事治理作用较弱。

英文摘要：

Perks＇ economic effect is closely related to its economic nature and corporate governance intensity. Perks in Chinese company consists of three components with monetary compensation supplementary, normal position-related consumption and entertainment consumption, that monetary compensation supplementary has incentive effect, normal position-related consumption can enhance the executive efficiency and reduce transaction cost, entertainment consumption will bring agency cost. Perks＇ economic effect depends on the economic benefits of the first two components and the agency cost of the latter. If the former is greater than the latter, it expresses as ＂efficiency view＂, on the contrary, it shows ＂agency view＂. Corporate governance is an important factor affecting perks＇ economic effect that the higher corporate governance intensity is, the stronger the representation of ＂efficiency view＂ is. By empirical study, this paper confirmed perks＇ economic nature and economic effects in Chinese company, tested the influence of corporate governance on perks＇ economic effects and found conclusions as follows： Perks＇ three components of monetary compensation supplementary, normal position-related consumption and entertainment consumption existed side by side in Chinese company. On the whole, stronger ＂efficiency view＂ was showed for perks in Chinese company, which illustrated that monetary compensation supplementary and normal position-related consumption occupied the dominant position. Perks＇ economic effects displayed stronger＂efficiency view＂ for companies of higher ＂concentration degree of equity＂ and ＂shareholding proportion of institutional investors＂, on the contrary, there was no relationship between performance and perks. The ratio of independent directors had no significant effect on perks＇ economic effect, which showed that the supervision of independent directors was weak.