中文摘要：

目前,经营者薪酬契约设计大都以会计盈余为业绩标准、以当期业绩（短期业绩）为计量依据,容易诱发经营者的短期博弈行为。本文以价值创造为业绩标准,并将长短期业绩相结合设计经营者薪酬契约,得出如下几点结论：（1）垄断行业经营者的努力水平低于竞争性行业,并且垄断盈余比例越大,经营者的努力程度越低。为调动经营者积极性,需要在垄断行业内部引入竞争机制。（2）剩余分享比例越大,经营者的努力程度越高;单位努力成本越大,经营者越趋向于选择较低的努力水平;能力较强的经营者通常选择较高的努力水平。因此,企业应择优选择经营者,为其创造最佳的工作环境和条件,灵活设计经营者剩余分享比例,以提高经营者的工作努力程度。（3）竞争性行业经营者短期博弈行为远远高于垄断行业,以价值创造为基础并将长短期业绩相结合设计经营者薪酬契约是明智的选择。

英文摘要：

Nowadays,managers＇ compensation contract mostly takes profit as performance measure standard and is designed according to short-term performance,which easily induces managers＇ short-term behavior.This paper regards value creation as performance measure standard and integrates long-term and short-term performance into managers＇ compensation contract.Its conclusion concludes three aspects： In the first,managers in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries,and the greater the proportion of monopoly earnings is,the less effort managers make,so it is necessary to introduce competitive mechanism in monopoly industries in order to motivate managers＇enthusiasm.Secondly,the bigger the proportion of surplus share is,the more effort managers make,and the higher per-unit effort cost is,the less effort managers choose.Higher capable managers usually select more effort,which means that managers should be selected carefully and given better working environment,and the proportion of surplus share should be designed freely in order to improve managers＇effort.Thirdly,managers＇ short-term behavior in competitive industries is more than that in monopoly industries,so it is wise to design managers＇ compensation contract based value creation and combination of long-term and short-term performance.