中文摘要：

供应链协调是提高供应链整体利润、改善供应链各方利益的根本手段.旨在探讨生产商 具有生产规模不经济特性的双渠道供应链协调策略.给出了集中决策下双渠道供应链的市场 价格与整体利润,以及分散决策下批发价契约与收益共享契约的设计方法.提出了协调度的概 念,即契约使供应链协调的程度.证明了批发价契约的协调度小于1,不能实现供应链的协调;而收益共享契约的协调度等于1,但相对于批发价契约,收益共享契约不能同时改善零售商和 生产商的利润,导致收益共享契约不可实施.为找到双渠道供应链可实施的协调策略,提出了 带固定补偿的收益共享契约的设计方法和用纳什讨价还价协商模型确定固定补偿的方法.结 果表明,该契约的协调度等于1,并且相对于批发价契约能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润. 另外,研究还表明：生产不经济的弹性系数与销售价格成正比、与供应链的整体利润成反比,并 且不同渠道间的竞争越激烈,双渠道供应链的销售价格和需求反而越高,双渠道供应链的总利 润也越高,并且,带固定补偿的收益共享契约同样可以协调线性成本下的双渠道供应链.最后 用算例验证了本文结论的正确性和有效性.

英文摘要：

Supply chain coordination is the fundamental means to improve the supply chain＇s overall profits and the interests of all parties. The goal of this paper is to investigate the coordination strategy of dual channel supply chains in which a manufacturer has diseconomies of scale of production. The paper shows the market prices and overall profit of dual channel supply chains in centralized decision-making and the design method of wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract in decentralized decision-making. The concept of coordination degree is proposed,which represents the degree a contract coordinates the supply chain. It is proved that if the coordination degree of wholesale price contract is less than 1,coordinating of the supply chain cannot be achieved,and that if the coordination degree of the revenue-sharing contract is equal to 1,relative to the wholesale price contract,the revenue sharing contract cannot improve the profits of retailers and manufacturers,resulting in an unenforced able revenue sharing contract. In order to find the enforceable coordination strategy of the dual channel supply chain,the paper puts forward the design method of the revenue-sharing contract with fixed compensation which is determined by Nash bargaining negotiation model. The results show that the coordination degree of the contract is equal to 1,and that,compared with the wholesale price contract,the contract can also improve the retailer＇s and the manufacturer＇s profit. In addition,the study also shows that： the diseconomies of scale elasticity coefficient is proportional to the sales price and inversely proportional to the overall profit of the supply chain; the more intense the competition between different channels,the higher the selling prices,the demand,and the earnings of the dual channel supply chain. Furthermore,the revenue sharing contract with fixed compensation can also coordinate the dual channel supply chain with linear costs. Finally,the correctness and effectiveness of the conclusion are valida