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中文摘要：
本文考虑一个由多供应商和单制造商构成的装配系统。当市场的需求时间无法确定时，制造商通过对供应商设定合理的库存分担策略来降低自身成本，供应商则需要自行决定对制造商的补货时间并承担相应的库存持有成本和延迟惩罚成本。文章同时建立了供应商之间的纳什博弈模型和以制造商为主方的主从博弈模型，以找到供应商的最佳供货时间和制造商最优的库存承担时限。通过对比不同模式下供应链的整体绩效，找到实现供应链协调运作的必要条件，并通过数据分析进一步证明相关结论。
英文摘要：
In a assembly system with uncertain demand time, suppliers＇ uncoordinated deliver times can heavily bring down the manufacturer＇s and the supply chain＇s performances. Under such a circumstance, manufacturer has to use some inventory control policies （e. g. , VMI） to reduce his inventory cost, while the supplier tries to deliver at the most appropriate time. In this paper, the supplier optimal deliver time and the manufacturer＇s best inventory holding period in an assemble system with uncertain demand time are studied. To this end, two different models are conducted in N-1 setting, the Nash game among the multi-suppliers, and the Stacklberg game between the manufacturer and the suppliers. The manufacturer＇ s optimal limited inventory holding period under two different conditions is also discussed. One is the man- ufacturer that sets the same inventory holding period to all the suppliers, and the other is the manufacturer that can choose different inventory holding periods to the different suppliers. The result identifies the suppliers＇ optimal deliver time and shows that the manufacturer can effectively improve his and the channel＇s profit by either means. In other words, traditional VMI policy isn＇t good for neither the manufacturer nor the supply chain. By numerical analysis, the sensitivities of the supplier heterogeneity are identified, and it is shown that the supply chain efficiency increases when the manufacturer is able to choose different inven- tory holding periods. Moreover, the essential condition for the supply chain coordination is concisely provided.
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