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中文摘要：
现有的基于拍卖的排污权初始分配方法在提高排污权初始分配效率方面取得了较好的成效，但仅适用于污染物种类单一的排污权。为满足排污企业购买多种污染物排污权的需求，将排污权初始分配问题建模为多单位组合拍卖，并提出了一种公平、有效的拍卖机制。结果表明，该机制不仅允许排污企业对排污权组合投标，而且能够激励排污企业披露真实的污染治理成本类型，使排污权流向污染治理成本高的排污企业。最后，通过一个算例说明了所提出机制的可操作性。
英文摘要：
Existing methods for the initial allocation of emission permits based on auctions have been successful in improving the effi‐ciency of initial allocation of emission permits ,but they focus only on the homogeneous pollutants emission permits .In order to satis‐fy the requirements of polluters as they need various pollutants emission permits ,this paper models the initial allocation problem of emission permits as a multi-unit combinatorial auction ,and proposes a fair and effective auction mechanism .The results show that the mechanism has three properties .Firstly ,the mechanism can allow polluters to bid for combination of emission permits .Second‐ly ,the mechanism can encourage polluters to declare their types of pollution treatment costs .Thirdly ,the mechanism can drive e‐mission permits to polluters of high treatment costs .Finally ,a simple numerical example is given to show the operability of the auc‐tion mechanism proposed in this paper .
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