中文摘要：

作为一种纵向控制手段，转售价格控制（RPM）被制造商频繁使用，成为颇具争议的纵向约束手段。近期合生元等九家乳粉企业在中国的价格垄断案件．更是把RPM推到风口浪尖。本文尝试对上游制造商RPM策略的实施动因进行理论解析：并以国内外反垄断规制案件判决的实践基准，讨论RPM策略的规制对象与规制路径。研究表明：在上游制造商合谋的情形下，RPM会导致较高的零售价，在排他性策略下，RPM则会降低零售价；因而合谋策略下的制造商RPM行为需要被规制；不过。部分合谋情形下的规制对象是参与合谋的制造商和零售商．主动全面合谋的规制对象是价格领导型制造商．制度约束下的被动全面合谋的规制对象则是制度本身。进一步地，本文针对上游制造商的合作策略与非合作策略．依据RPM实施动因和规制对象的不同，将RPM的规制路径分别解析为惩戒式规制路径、焦点式规制路径和豁免式规制路径。

英文摘要：

As a kind of vertical controlling tool, resale price maintenance （RPM） is frequently used by manufacturers and becomes the one of the most controversy vertical restraints. In China, the recent antitrust case that nine powdered milk manufacturers including biostime controlled retail price of powdered milk product through the RPM arrangements between producers and retailers, left RPM the place where the wind and waves are highest alone. This paper explores the regulated factors of RPM strategy, combining the theory with the practices, and then analyses the regulated objects of RPM strategy, regarding the antitrust and regulation cases for RPM as an criteria. We find that RPM could facilitate manufacturers cartelizing, which leads to higher retail price, in contrast, as a tool of exclusion, RPM lowers retail price, therefore, finns＇ RPM behavior under the case of collusion should be regulated. In the case of the part-collusion, the regulated objects are manufacturers participating collusion and the retailers participating collusion. The regulated objects of initiative collusion of all are price-leading manufacturers, however, that of system-constraint collusion of all is the relevant RPM antitrust-immunity mechanism. Further, in view of the upstream manufacturers implanting RPM strategy, this study divides the regulated path of RPM into punitive-regulated path, regulated-focal path and immune-regulated path, according to the different implementing factors and the different regulated objects for RPM.