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中文摘要：
＂公司＋农户＂这一组织模式在其运行过程中面临着越来越多的问题与困境,高违约率的现实使得分析公司和农户间契约的内在机制、设计更加有效的契约形式显得尤为迫切。在我国法律尚不能完全强制契约执行的前提下,合理的风险分担机制应该是解决农业契约违约率过高、提高农业契约运作效率的基本方向。基于重复博弈理论,公司和农户签订长期契约并且将风险贴水作为一种自我履约机制,将有助于抑制公司的违约倾向,保证契约的稳定运作。
英文摘要：
The model of ＂Processors ＋ Growers＂ has been facing an increasing number of problems and difficulties during its operation.The instability and the high default rate of these contracts have prompted us to analyze the inner mechanisms and design more effective forms of contracts.As Chinas law enforcement contract is still not fully implemented,the reasonable risk-sharing mechanism should be the basic direction to solve the high default rates of these contracts and improve the operational efficiency.On repeated game theory,the paper shows that a reasonable risk premium which the processors promised to give growers will help to curb the processors＇ default tendency and ensure stability.
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