中文摘要：

我国目前采用的是＂委托—代理＂型的耕地保护体制,强调外部约束,忽视内部激励,造成了区域间和不同社会成员间的不公平,由此产生的＂委托—代理＂问题是造成耕地保护不力的主要原因。耕地保护补偿通过转移支付手段调整耕地价值分配,纠正耕地保护过程中的不公平,促使耕地资源价值的外部性内部化,提高耕地保护效率。运用外部性内部化的基本原理可以描述这一价值分配调整过程,并构建耕地保护补偿的理论基础,据此建立全国耕地保护补偿的＂双纵双横＂模式,为推进全国耕地保护补偿工作提供实施框架。

英文摘要：

A ＂principal-agent＂ type of farmland protection system is currently employed in China,with emphasis on the external constraints,but ignoring the internal motivation,which results in the inequities between different social members and different regions and adverse effects on farmland protection.Therefore,compensation for farmland protection should be used to rectify the unfairness,to internalize the externalities of farmland and to enhance the inefficiency of farmland protection.Based on the theory of externalities internalization and the study of farmland protection problems,a ＂Double Longitudinal and Double Horizontal＂ compensation model is built up,to prepare a basic operation structure for future compensation work.