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中文摘要：
以单机为背景,重点针对具有正规型和非正规型时间效用函数的自利任务同时存在的情况,研究了异构任务（或代理）影响稀缺资源分配效率这一问题.为此,建立了描述问题的非合作博弈模型,定义了Nash均衡调度与Pareto调度的概念,讨论了两者之间的关系,给出了判定Nash均衡调度是否为Pareto调度的充要条件,并定量分析了Pareto调度可能导致的系统全局性能恶化程度,即无秩序代价.由此揭示资源分配问题中异构的自利资源使用者与资源提供方之间的冲突机理,并明确异构任务给资源分配效率带来的影响.
英文摘要：
The influence of heterogeneous selfish tasks（ or agents） on the efficiency of single machine resources allocation is studied,in which regular tasks and non-regular tasks exist simultaneously. Hence,noncooperative game is introduced to modeling such problems,and corresponding Nash equilibrium schedule and Pareto schedule are defined. The relationship between two solution concepts is investigated and a sufficient and necessary condition is given to judge whether a Nash equilibrium schedule is a Pareto schedule or not. The Price of Anarchy of Pareto schedule which quantitatively measures the loss of the system’s global optimum is analyzed. The results reveal the conflict mechanism among resource users and resource providers,and explain the influence of heterogeneous selfish tasks（ or agents） on the efficiency of resources allocation.
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