在一个供应商和一个销售商组成的单周期供应链中,讨论了收益共享合约进行供应链协调的问题.与以往研究集中于讨论批发价及收益共享率等决策变量不同的是,在扩展了经典报童模型的基础上,对由于非对称信息引发的供应链不协调现象进行解析.通过比较信息对称和非对称条件下的收益共享契约的设计,进一步讨论当经销商实际执行的收益共享率风险波动时,供应商相应的协调策略.建立了收益共享率风险波动情况下以期望收益最大化为目标的数学模型,分别讨论了经典收益共享、收益共享率风险波动和供应商不考虑风险情况下供应链各方的最优策略.
This paper investigated the decisions in a single-period supply chain that is characterized by revenue-sharing contracts.In contrast to much of the previous research that has been done on revenue-sharing contracts which concerns the wholesale price and revenue-sharing rate,the paper extended the basic newsvendor model,and therefore examined the efficiency of supply chain under asymmetric information,references were given to every parts of supply chain.Different revenue-sharing contract designs were contrasted under symmetric and asymmetric information,in order to figure out the coordination strategy of supplier when retailer's actual revenue-sharing rate risk fluctuating.A mathematical model was established to maximize the expected profit when revenue-sharing rates risk fluctuates.The paper discussed different profits variations of three different situations including classical revenue-sharing,revenue-sharing rate risk fluctuating and without the supplier's considering risk fluctuations situations.