中文摘要：

我国上市公司处于大股东控制状态，在上市公司配股融资过程中，大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票发行价格的强烈动机。本文以实施配股的上市公司为样本，基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征，并分析了大股东控制下盈余管理行为带来的隧道效应。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为，而配股后长期业绩趋于下降；（2）配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒U型关系；（3）大股东的盈余管理行为导致了上市公司价值的下降。因此，大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应，误导了外部投资者的决策，造成了上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。

英文摘要：

The listed companies in China are strongly controlled by large shareholders, and these listed companies have strong incentive to manage earnings upward by altering discretionary accruals to gain the rights issues and raise stock prices. This paper takes 456 refinancing firms from 1998 to 2002 as sample and examines the time-series distribution of earnings management around the offerings based on the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model, and studies the association between discretionary accruals and the control of largest shareholder.The results suggest that listed companies, on average, have high positive discretionary accruals in 3 years preceding and the year of SEOs, and that there is an inverse U-shape relation between earnings management and the largest shareholder＇s share.The results also show that the efficiency of capital allocation and corporate value will decrease with the rising of the degree of earnings manipulation, The larger shareholders expropriate outsider investors through earnings management in refinancing, and efficiency of capital allocation, firm value, reputation and capability of refinancing are heavily damaged.