中文摘要：

随着股权分置改革的成功推进和全流通时代的到来，大股东向上市公司注入资产成为当前我国证券市场的热点现象，而大股东与中小股东之间严重的信息不对称导致大股东具有虚增注入资产价值的强烈动机。本文建立了一个模型将虚增注入资产价值与市场参与者的财富变化结合起来，分析了虚增注入资产价值的财富效应及动态演化特征。研究结果表明：（1）大股东通过虚增注入资产价值可以获得中小股东无法得到的私人收益，降低了中小股东的财富；（2）大股东的收益随着注入资产价值虚增程度的增加而提升，中小股东的财富随着注入资产价值虚增程度的增加而降低；（3）虚增注入资产价值为大股东带来的边际收益将超过社会总财富的边际收益。因此，大股东通过虚增注入资产价值实现了对中小股东财富的掠夺效应，导致上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。

英文摘要：

Along with the promotion of share-trading reform and overall-circulation of A share, asset injection by large shareholders has become a highlight phenomena, but the information asymmetry between large shareholders and small investors leads to the strong motivation of false asset injection. This paper develops a model to study the dynamic envelopment characteristic of false asset injection and wealth change of market participants. The results suggest that firstly, large shareholders can obtain private benefits at the cost of small shareholders through manipulating asset injection. Secondly, with the increase of asset injection manipulation, the benefits of large shareholders increase, and in contrast, the benefits of small shareholders decrease accordingly. Thirdly, the marginal benefit of larger shareholders will exceed that of social total benefit. Therefore, the larger shareholders expropriate outsider investors from the manipulation in the course of asset injection, while the efficiency of capital allocation; firm value, reputation and capability of refinancing are heavily damaged.