中文摘要：

最近,普里查德提出了一种非常有说服力的知识理论,即反运气德性知识论。该理论主张知识必须具备两个基本条件,即能力条件和反运气条件：前者指知识必须是认知能力的产物,后者指知识必须排除掉认知运气。普里查德认为这种理论更符合直觉地解释知识的本质和结构,而且还能够更好地解决知识的价值问题。然而,这个理论存在严重的问题,它夸大了运气在知识论中的作用,并且错误地使用了克雷格的概念谱系学。

英文摘要：

Recently, Duncan Pritchard presents a very convincing theory of knowledge, called ＂anti-luck virtue epistemology＂（viz. ALVE）. This theory holds that knowledge must have two basic conditions, namely ability condition and anti-luck condition. The former means knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability, while the latter means knowledge must rule out epistemic luck. Pritchard argues that this theory is superior to other kinds of virtue epistemology, because it not only can provide more intuitive explanation of the nature and structure of knowledge, but also can better address the value problem of knowledge, especially the tertiary value problem. However, it has several serious problems： it exaggerated the role of luck in the theory of knowledge, and wrongly used Craig＇s concept genealogy.