中文摘要：

信念规范问题不仅是重要的社会实践问题，也是哲学领域的热点问题。对于信念的真理规范，基于真理概念的反驳思路主张真理概念的内在价值并不足以辩护真理规范。信念的真理规范面临着两分缺陷、应用难题和局部性难题。从认知维度上看。信念的发生与修正应该执行的是知识规范。信念的知识规范的恰当解读是“s相信P是认知上可允许的，当且仅当s知道P”。它强调的是一种认知规范，而不是审慎规范或道德规范。与此同时，它进一步弱化了规范力，给信念自由留出了更多的空间。

英文摘要：

The issue of norm of belief is not only an important issue of social practice, but also a fundamental issue of epistemology. When it comes to the truth norm of belief, the refutation approach based on the concept of truth claims that the intrinsic value of truth is unable to justify the truth norm. The truth norm of belief cannot argue against the dualistic defect, the application difficulty and the locality question. In terms of epistemic dimensions, the formatting and revising of belief should follow the modified reading of the knowledge norm of belief, which is ＂S believes that P is epistemically permissible, if and only if S knows P＂. This approach emphasizes epistemic norm of belief, not moral or prudential one. In addition, it modifies the normative force and leaves more room for doxastic freedom.