采用真实任务实验方法,探讨任务依赖性与薪酬机制因素对代理人拆台行为的影响。利用对96个被试进行的4个实验,获得如下结论:①任务依赖,团队薪酬按贡献分配时,高能力的个体更倾向于实施拆台;然而团队薪酬平均分配时,低能力个体的拆台行为更频繁。②任务依赖背景下,团队中能力最低的成员成为“众矢之的”,遭到竞争团队的集中拆台;任务独立时,竞争团队则聚焦于对团队中能力最强的成员实施拆台。换言之,“木桶理论”在任务依赖情景下成立,而“擒贼先擒王”观点在任务独立情景下得到支持。
This paper is intended to identify the effects of the task dependence and compensation distribution mechanism on the agents' sabotage behavior.By carrying out four field experiments with 96 subjects,we come to the following conclusions:(1)in task-dependent setting,high-ability individuals are more likely to sabotage than low-ability individuals when compensation is based on contribution,while low-ability individuals engage in more sabotage when compensation is based on equal sharing;(2)in taskdependent setting,the lowest-ability individual in the team suffers most sabotage;while in taskindependent setting,the competition team focuses sabotages on the highest-ability individual in the rival team.That is to say,"buckets effect"is supported in task independent setting,and "to catch bandits,first catch the king leader"is supported in task dependent setting.