中文摘要：

在基于相对业绩比较的锦标赛激励机制中，首位晋升制与末位淘汰制是两种常见的竞赛激励机制。在代理人能力分布不均情形下，将代理人之间的拆台行为引入传统的锦标赛模型，可以研究代理人能力分布不同时首位晋升制与末位淘汰制下代理人的行为以及对委托人收益的影响。通过数理模型推导可获得以下结论：第一，首位晋升制下代理人的努力水平和拆台水平均比较高，委托人采用首位晋升制更有利，能力分布对委托人最优选择不产生影响。第二，低能力代理人占多数时，高能力代理人努力水平过高，受到的拆台也更多，高能力代理人占多数时，低能力代理人努力水平更高受到的拆台更多，能力分布对代理人的行为产生影响。

英文摘要：

Winner-up tournaments and loser-out tournaments are two common forms of incentive mechanism in relative- performance-based tournaments. In this paper, we bring sabotage between heterogeneous agents into classic tournament model and study its influence on the principle＇s income in both winner-up tournaments and loser-out tournaments under different conditions. By deriving the mathematical model, we come to the following conclusions： First, the first promotion under the agent＇s effort level and sabotage level are relatively high, the client uses winner-up more favorable, ability distribution on the client does not affect the optimal choice. Second, low ability agents accounted for the majority, high ability of the agent＇s effort level is too high, the more trouble, high ability agents accounted for the majority, low ability of the agent＇s effort level is more higher self, affect the distribution of the agent＇s behavior ability.