中文摘要：

针对我国当前排污费标准偏低的问题,构建政府、污染企业和环保企业的三方完全信息静态博弈模型,分析影响参与方行为策略均衡形成的关键变量,找出最优排污费生成的内部作用机制。结论认为,其他条件一定的情况下,单一排污费标准对处在不同市场结构的企业的利润的影响不同。排污费标准不是越高就越利于环境保护,也不是越低就越利于经济发展。排污费标准的制定应视污染企业和环保企业的市场结构情况而定。

英文摘要：

Focusing on the problem of the current sewage charges system, this paper de- signs a static game of complete information with the government, polluting firms and the environment firms, finding the internal mechanism which identifies the optimal sewage charges through the analysis of the key elements that affect the game equilibrium. The study finds the result that the optimal sewage charges are determined by the number of firms, price elasticity, the changes in firm earnings when the charges are modified, the produc- tion efficiency of the polluting firms and the efficiency of abatement activities.