引入零售商风险规避偏好,在努力水平影响需求的两种模式下,分别建立了销售回馈与惩罚契约模型。随后,探讨了单纯的销售回馈与惩罚契约能否实现供应链协调,以及协调时各契约参数满足的条件。最后,通过数值分析对契约的协调性进行进一步分析。
This paper introduces the retailer's risk aversion in a two stage supply chain. Under both the additive and multiplicative sales effort dependent demands,the issue of supply chain coordination and optimization with risk-averse retailer and sales effort sensitive demand under a single sales rebate and penalty contract is explored. Besides,the optimal conditions that the contract parameters must satisfy in order to achieve supply chain coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to further illustrate the role of sales rebate and penalty contract.