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中文摘要：
提出IPO净抑价的概念．利用统一价格份额拍卖的分析方法，在机构投资者同质且风险中性假设的前提下，以其期望效用最大化为目标，研究机构投资者在IPO事前中购总量确定情况下的最优报价策略，并推导出均衡时的IPO发行价格和IPO净抑价的表达式．最后得到了线性均衡报价策略要严格占优于非线性均衡报价策略，且机构投资者需求隐藏程度与IPO净抑价正相关以及净抑价必然存在的结论．
英文摘要：
In this paper , the conception of net underprieing is put forward. Using the method of the uniformprice share auctions and supposing the institutional investors being homogeneous , risk-neutral with the goal of the maximal expected-utility value, we study the optimal auction strategies of the institutional investors for their request quantity being certain ex ante and deduce the equilibrium expressions of IPO price and its net underpricing. Then we obtain the results that the linear equilibrium auction strategy strictly dominates nonlinear equilibrium auction strategy, and that the hidden demand of the institutional investors and IPO net underpricing are positively related, and that the net underpricing exists.
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