中文摘要：

针对无线传感器网络节点影响网络可用性与整体性能的自私行为,建立了一种传感器网络节点包转发策略的重复博弈模型.利用节点与邻居节点的重复博弈过程,理性节点采取合作策略,确保背离的自私节点参与合作;证明了该无限重复博弈模型可达到纳什均衡,能够有效地促进节点自发合作.仿真结果表明,在当前最优包转发概率下,节点之间合作获得增强,节点不愿采取背离策略,网络整体效用接近理想状态.

英文摘要：

By analyzing the selfish behavior of the wirel work availability and performance ,we propose the repeated ess sensor network node which affect the netgame model to solve packet forwarding problem in wireless sensor networks. Through the repeated games process among the node and neighbor node, the rational nodes will take the cooperation strategy to ensure the devistion selfish nodes join in the cooperation, and show that this infinitely repeated game model achieves the Nash equilibrium, and enables the nodes to adopt the spontaneous cooperation strategy. The simulation results verify that the nodes do not want to take the departure from the cooperation strategy at the probability of the optimal packet forwarding, the cooperation greatly enhanced among the nodes, the overall effectiveness of the network close to the ideal state.