Gelman 和花蕾发现成年人和孩子是对象说出对一个对象怎么被创造敏感(人造) ,但是他们没在在哪个概念的系统的特定的水平上,这效果是上揭示。用一项免费说出的任务和一项力量选择任务,二个实验被进行测试这效果是的一个假设明确地在领域水平上(“ artifact/non-artifacf 区别) 。在实验 1,参加者被问到描绘 nameshortly 的目标,评估他们的信心,并且报导他们为每说出的回答的原因。结果显示出说出的回答的那个大多数在“人造”状况处于“自然”的状况在人工制品领域,和大多数在非人工制品领域,尽管在两个条件名字我们在基本水平上分叉的空想。在实验 2,另一组参加者被要求从二个名字(在在非人工制品领域的人工制品领域和其它的) 选择一个匹配在第一个实验介绍的描绘 sameshortly 的对象。在领域水平上的实验 1 的结果在实验 2 被复制。这些会聚的调查结果支持了目标的起源的效果是的假设 thai 明确地在目标的概念的系统的领域水平上。Reasonsexplicitly 报导了因为在实验 i 说出回答建议参加者可能自动地推断对象的函数在“人造”状况然而并非处于“自然”的状况。人工制品分类的 Herethe 基于功能的假设被讨论。
Gelman and Bloom found that adults and children's object naming was sensitive to how an object was created (man-made or not), but they did not reveal on which specific level of conceptual system this effect was. Using a free-naming task and a force-choice task, two experiments were conducted to test a hypothesis that this effect was specifically on domain level ("artifact/non-artifact" distinction), in Experiment 1, participants were asked to name shortly-depicted objects, rate their confidence, and report their reasons for each naming response. Resuits showed that most of the naming responses in "man-made" condition were in artifact domain, and most in "natural" condition were in non-artifact domain, although in both conditions names were very divergent on basic level. In Experiment 2, another group of participants were asked to choose one from two names (one in artifact domain and the other in non-artifact domain) to match the same shortly-depicted objects presented in the first experiment. Results of Experiment 1 on domain level were replicated in Experiment 2. These convergent findings supported the hypothesis that the effect of object's origin is specifically on domain level of conceptual system of objects. Reasons explicitly reported for naming responses in Experiment 1 suggested that participants might automatically infer objects' functions in "man-made" condition but not in "natural" condition. Here the function-based hypothesis of artifacts classification is discussed.