文章目的在于探究地方政府普遍热衷的“土地引资”模式的形成机制及其表现。以河北省石家庄市下辖的A县和B县为例,综合考察了两县的地区生产总值、固定资产投资、建设用地指标分配情况和实际成交情况。虽然在经济发展水平上B县远远落后于A县,但却一直与A县进行着同质化的竞争,导致产业结构相似,无法形成比较优势实现差异化竞争。市级在分配年度计划指标时,更多的是考虑各县间的平衡,而不是如何提高利用效率,地区间均衡发展的初衷在地方政府GDP竞争的背景下事与愿违。
This article aims to discuss the formation and performance of land-orientation investment. Based on observation of county A' s and county B' s GDP, fixed investment, suggestion of annual plan of land use, actual an- nual plan of land use, and land transaction announcements, the authors conclude that although county B is far be- hind from county A in economy development, they are taking a homogeneous competition, which leads them to have same industrial structures that block their comparative advantage developments. At the same time, the principle of municipal land bureau uses to distribute the amount of industrial land to each county is how to make a balance a- mong all the counties, not how to improve productivity of land use.