文章基于中国20世纪80年代以来省级地方党政首长的来源匹配数据,实证分析了地方官员匹配对经济增长的影响。结果发现,地方经济增长绩效与地方党政首长来源匹配类型相关;由外来地方党政首长匹配的类型,会有相对低的经济增长绩效;随着干部管理体制的变迁,党委首长与行政首长的来源背景的相对重要性发生了有序转变。文章的发现为优化干部官员的配置效率提供了有益的经验启示。
By exploiting Chinese provincial officials data,this paper empirically studies the economic growth effect of official matching.The authors find the economic performance is affected by the source matching types of party secretary and governor;matching type of party secretary and governor not from local has relatively low economic growth performance;with the change of cadre management system,the relative importance of party secretary and governor reverse.The findings provide a useful enlightenment to optimize the efficiency of the allocation of cadres and officials.