中文摘要：

考虑由制造商、零售商与第三方回收再制造商构成的闭环供应链系统，制造商同时拥有传统与直销两种销售渠道，且第三方再制造商只有在原制造商专利许可的条件下才可进行再制造活动．基于博弈理论建立了专利保护下双渠道闭环供应链的定价与协调决策模型，通过分析与对比集中决策与分散决策两种情形下闭环供应链均衡解、决策成员及系统利润的变化，发现分散化决策下系统的效率并不能达到最优．因此，通过对传统的收益共享契约加以改进实现了专利相关的双渠道闭环供应链的协调．最后，运用数值算例分析了模型中关键参数的变化对双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调的影响．

英文摘要：

Consider a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a retailer, a remanufacturer who can simultane- ously sell products through the traditional and direct channel and a third-party remanufacturer who can only collect and remanufacture under the patent protection from the original manufacturer. Based on game theory, this paper establishes a pricing and coordination model for dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under the patent protection. The equilibrium solutions, the channel members＇ profits and the total profits of system are compared in the decentralized and centralized models, the result shows that the decentralized case would lead to a loss of efficiency of the whole supply chain. Hence, a modified revenue-sharing contract is designed to co- ordinate the decentralized supply chain. Finally, some numerical examples is conducted to analyze the impacts of some key parameters on the pricing and coordination decisions of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain.