中文摘要：

按是否拥有传统汽车将潜在消费者分成两类，基于不同购买行为的消费者，根据消费者购买行为理论，针对每一类消费者分别建立效用模型，运用斯坦伯格博弈理论求解得到厂商的最优定价策略和政府的最优补贴策略，进而分析政府考虑包括厂商收益、消费者剩余、政府支出以及环境效益在内的社会福利最大化时电动汽车的环境质量、传统汽车原拥有比例以及消费者惯性三因素对电动汽车普及率、政府补贴以及生产商收益的影响。研究结果表明：当生产成本小于某阀值时，电动汽车的市场需求随电动汽车的环境质量的增加而增大，传统汽车的市场需求则随之减小，反之亦然。电动汽车的生产效率较高时，政府的最优补贴随产品环境质量的增加而增大，生产效率较低时，最优补贴随之减小，政府通过增大补贴的方式鼓励生产商提高生产效率。最后通过数值实验验证了以上结论，并分析得到以上三方面因素对生产商收益的影响。

英文摘要：

Potential customers are divided into two classes, according to whether they own the traditional vehi- cles. Based on the consumers who have different buying behavior, utility models for the two classes＇ consumers are built according to consumer buying behavior theory. Manufacturer＇ s optimal pricing strategy and the optimal subsidy policy of the government are derived adopting the Stackelberg game theory. Furthermore we analyze how the three factors including product＇ s environmental quality, original proportion of traditional vehicles and the consumer inertia affect the EV＇ s adoption, government subsidy and manufacturer＇ s profit when government max- imizes the social welfare which concludes manufacturer＇ s profit, consumer surplus, government spending and en- vironmental benefits. The research result shows that when the production cost is less than certain threshold val- ues, the increase in EV＇ s environmental quality results in the increase in EV＇ s market demand and also causes the decrease in the demand of traditional vehicle, and vice versa. As the EV＇ s environmental quality increases, government＇ s optimal subsidy also increases when the manufacturer has a high production efficiency of EV, and the optimal subsidy decreases when EV＇ s production efficiency is low, so government will increase the subsidy to encourage manufacturer to pursue high production efficiency. Finally, the numerical experiment result is presen- ted to verify the theoretical result and further illustrate the effects of the three factors mentioned above on manu- facturer＇ s profit.