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中文摘要：
针对现实中大量存在的双方信息不对称现象，建立了博弈双方逆向选择问题的一般化模型，提出博弈双方逆向选择可能出现的分离一分离、分离一混同、混同。分离、混同一混同4类均衡．通过将经典的垄断限价模型扩展为双方信息不对称条件下的逆向选择模型，验证了上述4类均衡，并分析了双方逆向选择垄断限价模型中高成本类型进入企业数量对均衡的影响．研究发现，高成本类型进入企业数量对均衡区间及均衡价格具有贴现作用，其作用大小依赖于不同情形下的均衡条件．
英文摘要：
Aiming at the abundant double-sided information asymmetric phenomena existing in reality, a generic model for double-sided adverse selection is constructed, in which four kinds of equilibriums, such as separating-separating, separating-pooling, pooling-separating, pooling-pooling, are put forward. Through extending the classical limited pricing model to a double-sided adverse selection under two-sided information asymmetry, four kinds of equilibriums are confirmed. In the limited pricing model of double-sided adverse selection impacts which the high-cost type entrant firm＇s quantity has on the equilibriums are analyzed. It is found that the high-cost type entrant firm＇s quantity has an effect as discount factor whose degree depends on the conditions of equilibrium under different cases.
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