中文摘要：

环境保护事务的特殊性决定了财政联邦主义无法也不可能替代环境联邦主义，只有依据环境事务的内在逻辑，构建直接度量环境分权的指标体系，才能够全面客观揭示环境分权背后的效应机理。立足环境管理体制变迁的视角。本文系统梳理了中国环境分权演进的三个阶段，运用环境机构人员分布数据，测算环境分权、行政分权、监测分权和监察分权指数，阐述了分权指数变化的内在逻辑。在此基础上，采用静态、动态和动态空间面板模型及方法．考察了环境分权与环境污染之间的关系。研究发现，四类分权与环境污染之间呈现出显著且稳定的正向关系．环境分权加剧了财政分权对环境保护的激励不足．西部地区环境分权的负面影响更为明显：伴随着环境分权度的下降，其年度效应逐步降低并由正转负，凸显了近年来中央政府环保干预力度加大的有效性和重要性；环境分权、监测分权与环境污染呈U型关系，而行政分权、监察分权与环境污染呈倒U型关系，赋予地方政府适度有限的环境管理权、监测权以及充分的环境行政权和监察权更有利于改进环境治理。推进环境管理体制结构性改革与做对地方环境保护激励约束是持续提升中国环境治理水平和改善环境质量的重要制度基础。

英文摘要：

The distinctiveness of environmental protection affair determines that fiscal federalism can not substitute for environmental federalism. Only through constructing index system which directly measures fiscal decentralization according to the inherent logic of environmental affair, can we objectively reveal the effect mechanism of environmental decentralization. In the perspective of environmental regulation, this paper reviews three stages of China＇s environmental decentralization evolution, measuring the index of environmental, administrative, monitoring and inspecting decentralization with distribution data of environmental agency staff, describes the internal logic of decentralization index changes. On this basis, we examine the correlation between environmental decentralization and environmental pollution by using static and dynamic methods and dynamic spatial panel model. We find that, environmental, administrative, monitoring and inspecting decentralization have significant positive correlation with environmental pollution and environmental decentralization further lowers the incentive of environmental protection to local governments, which is much more significant in western area; With the decreasing environmental decentralization, its annual effect reduces from positive to negative, which demonstrates the significance and effectiveness of central government＇s increasing intervention on environmental protection; We find a U-shaped relationship between environmental, monitoring decentralization and environmental pollution and an inverted U-shaped relationship between administrative, inspecting decentralization and environmental pollution, which shows that conferring limited environmental management and monitoring authority to local governments and conferring full environmental administration and inspection authority to local governments would help to improve environmental protection affair. Pushing forward the structural reform of environmental management and construct the incentive and restraint mechan