逆向多属性拍卖正日渐成为主要的电子采购机制,其中投标策略以及拍卖收益性是拍卖参与人重点关心的问题,首先针对两种典型的逆向多属性拍卖机制-逆向多属性英式拍卖和逆向多属性第一得分密封拍卖,分别给出了投标人的投标策略和买卖双方的期望收益,该结论可以为拍卖参与人提供决策支持.然后证明了拍卖人在这两种典型的逆向多属性拍卖机制和另外两种多属性拍卖机制-多属性第二得分密封拍卖和多属性荷式拍卖中,拍卖期望收益是相等的这一定理,该结论是对期望收益相等定理在多属性拍卖机制中的进一步扩展.
Reverse multi-attribute auction is increasingly becoming one main mechanism for e-procurement.Bidding strategies and auction revenue are key concerns of the auction participants. In this paper, sellers'bidding strategies and the expected revenue of the sellers and the buyers are given respectively for two typicalreverse multi-attribute auction mechanisms: reverse multi-attribute English auction and reverse multi-attributefirst-score sealed auction. The above results can provide decision support for auction participants. One impor-tant theorem of this paper is that auction expected revenue is equal among the above both typical reverse multi-attribute auction mechanisms, multi-attribute second-score sealed-bid auction and multi-attribute Dutch auc-tion. This conclusion is a further expansion of the expected revenue equivalence theorem in the field of multi-attribute auction.