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中文摘要：
政府采购电子化提高效率节约费用是大势所趋。公开招投标是政府采购的主要方式。针对网上招投标应用局限，基于有限理性假设，结合我国国情，应用委托代理理论和进化博弈理论建立模型分析电子采购问题，提出面向政府采购的监督反馈式多属性电子拍卖机制，并对机制的有效性和合理性予以实例说明。
英文摘要：
It is shows a general tendency that E-procurement is applied to improve goverment procurement efficiency and reduce cost. To break the limitation existing in E-tender application which is a main E-goverment procurement mode, E-procurement mechanism is studied based on bounded rationality assumption and considering the situation of our country. After principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory approached to propose and analyze models, a new E-procurement mechanism is designed. It is named government procurement oriented multi-attribute E-auction with supervision and feedback, and its rationality and effectiveness is discussed with an example.
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