中文摘要：

本文借助异质品双寡头Stackelberg竞争模型,在国际贸易背景下考察进口国关税对外国企业授权策略选择及进口国社会福利的影响。研究表明,技术授权能否发生与授权方式、关税水平和技术创新程度有关。固定收费方式下,只有关税水平较高或技术创新程度较高时,技术授权才会发生;特许权收费和双重收费方式都增加了技术拥有企业利润,且双重收费方式可以实现技术拥有企业利润最大化。当技术创新程度较高或关税水平较高时,无论哪种授权方式都可能损害进口国社会福利。

英文摘要：

With the help of heterogeneous duopoly Stackelberg competition model,we analyze the effect of import taxes on the licensing modes and social welfare in the background of international trade. It shows that whether licensing occurs depending on licensing mode,import taxes and innovation degree. Fixed- fee will occur if and only if import taxes are high and the goods are very different. Royalty and two- part tariff can increase and maximize the profit of foreign enterprises. These three licensing modes may all decrease social welfare,especially under the conditions of high import taxes and high heterogeneous goods.