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中文摘要：
本文以消费者的网络接受程度的变化为切入点,对双渠道供应链中制造商对零售商补偿激励与否进行对比,采用Stackelberg博弈求解在制造商实施补偿前后的最优定价、补偿额度以及增加的销售努力水平。得出如下结论：制造商实施补偿激励能够增加其自身以及零售商利润,供应链利润亦会增加;实施补偿激励后直销价格、零售渠道价格以及批发价格均提高;利润水平、定价以及制造商提供的补偿额度和零售商增加的销售努力程度均受到零售商初始投入的销售成本的影响。
英文摘要：
In this paper, the network consumer acceptance changes as the starting point, by comparing whether the manufacturer provides compensation incentive for re- tailers in dual channel supply chain of compensation incentive for retailers, Stackel- berg game is adopted for solving the optimal pricing compensation amount and increase the sales effort. The conclusions are as follows： the manufacturer provides compensa- tion incentive can increase its profit and retailer, will also increase the profit of the supply chain; after the implementation of incentive compensation the selling price, retail price and wholesale price channels were improved; the profit level, pricing and compensation amount provided by the manufacturer and retailers＇ sales efforts are af- fected by the initial investment of the retailer cost of sales.
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