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中文摘要：
借助“囚徒困境”博弈模型分析植物品种权交易中普遍存在的道德风险问题。结果表明：在没有任何监督、惩罚措施的情况下，最终的博弈均衡只能是交易双方都选择不遵守策略，以实现各自利益的最大化；但通过对博弈模型进行适当的改进，就会发现只要监督和惩罚措施得当，提高其违约成本，交易双方就会为实现各自利益最大化而选择遵守策略，并据此得到实现植物品种权交易良性循环运作的有效条件，提高交易成功率。
英文摘要：
Moral hazard is a widespread problem in the process of plant variety rights exchange. Applying ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂ game theory model, this article analyses： without any supervision and punitive measures, the final balanced result of the transaction for both sides can only be ＂Not Comply＂ with strategies in order to achieve their own maximization of interests. However, as long as appropriate monitoring system and punitive measures have been strengthened and the costs of ＂Not Comply＂ have been increased through the appropriate improvement to the game theory model, the final balanced result of the transaction will force both sides to choose ＂Comply＂ with strategies in order to achieve maximization of interests for each side and for all of them. This article points out corresponding conditions for effective transaction and operation of plant variety rights.
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