分析了中国航空市场的特点,以定义不同票价等级下各航空公司所提供的座位数为决策变量,舱位容量为约束条件,各家航空公司收益最大化为多目标函数,构建竞争环境下中国航空公司舱位控制的博弈模型,利用拉格朗日乘数法求解各航空公司最优低价票数,并以此来确定均衡舱位。仿真试验表明:各家航空公司舱位控制策略相互制约且能够达到均衡状态,但受到旅客需求随机性的影响,在12000次的仿真试验中达到均衡的概率为12.68%,达不到均衡的概率为87.32%,因此,这种均衡是动态的且实现机率较低,结论与实际相符,模型切实可行。
Based on the analysis of domestic aviation market, the numbers of each airline's available tickets under different fare classes were regarded as decision variables, the seat capacity was taken as constraint, each airline's revenue maximum was taken as multi-objective function. A civil airline seat inventory control model in competition environment was set up, Lagrange multiplier method was used to solve the numbers of each airline's optimal low fare tickets, and the equilibrium seat was worked out. Simulation result shows that each airline's seat inventory control is restricted by each other and can arrive at equilibrium state. Due to the impact of passenger demand randomness, the model can achieve an equilibrium probability of 12.68 % and a non-equilibrium probability of 87.32% in 12 000 simulations. The equilibrium is dynamic and hard to reach. The conclusions are consistent with practice, so the model is feasible. 1 tab, 3 figs, 13 refs.