中文摘要：

为了解决在供应商的成本效率参数与努力水平信息不对称下销售商对供应商的激励问题,提出了显示原理和委托代理模型相结合的研究方法,并建立了最优静态契约。研究表明,在单阶段合作中,最优静态契约能够激励供应商真实地报出自己的成本效率并努力工作,从而最大化销售商的利润;但在多阶段合作中,由于棘轮效应的存在,最优静态契约难以有效地激励供应商,这时销售商的利润处于次优的水平;对此,提出了补贴协议,有效地解决了棘轮效应问题。

英文摘要：

To study incentive scheme under asymmetric information of the supplier＇s cost efficiency parameter and of its effort level parameter in a retailer-led supply chain, a method under a principal-Agent model and revelation principle was proposed. In this method, static incentive contract was established. Main results revealed that the static incentive contract established an incentive policy in one-period scheme to maximized retailer＇s profit which would motivate the supplier to give its real cost efficiency and to word hard; and that the static incentive contract could not work in multi-period because of the ratchet effect., doing more now reduces future rewards, under this circumstance, ＂Allowance Agreement＂ was proposed to deal with such ratchet effect.