中文摘要：

基于返回策略分析供应链协调与风险分担问题．该模型含有两种常见的返回政策：比例回购和折价回购．研究结果表明返回策略可以协调供应链．供应链协调时供应链风险在供应商和销售商之间的分担情况由回购折价参数和回购比例参数决定，并且风险分担情况符合一般的收益和风险之间的权衡关系，即获得的收益越高，承担的风险就越大．供应商的最优回购契约是：供应商允许销售商对剩余订货全部按批发价退货，供应商采用边际成本加成定价的方式来确定批发价，加成比例由市场需求的满足率决定；在最优情形下，节点企业分担的风险之比等于两企业在供应链最优订货量处的边际成本之比．

英文摘要：

In supply chain decision, the decentralized decision is used more than the centralized one, and a Stackelberg game is played between the supplier and the retailer, in which the supplier is often the leader, while the retailer is the follower. In this paper, we consider that the supplier maximizes his own profit by designing an advisable contract, while the retailer increases his profit by increasing his sales volume with effort. This paper establishes a one-stage supply chain model based on buy back polices, in which the newsvendor problem is studied. The model includes two types of buy back polices： proportion and rebate buy back, and the retailer＇ s sales effort is embedded in the model in order to give the retailer an incentive to sell. On the basis of the above, the paper analyses the mean income and the mean risk loss of the supplier, the retailer and the whole supply chain, respectively and gives the sufficient and necessary condition for the coordination of the supply chain.