中文摘要：

文章分析了由一个制造商与一个分销商所组成的二级供应链中,既存在契约签订之前的逆向选择问题又存在契约签订之后的道德风险问题这一情况下,制造商对分销商的类型甄别及努力激励的机制设计问题。主要得到以下结论：①制造商可以通过努力收益分享的方式激励销售商投入最优的努力水平,进而规避道德风险行为。②制造商通过设计一组激励相容机制可以达到甄别分销商类型的目的,但必须支付给高销售能力分销商一定的租金。③高销售能力分销商的销量水平不存在扭曲,而低销售能力分销商的销量水平向下扭曲,其原因在于制造商降低给低销售能力分销商规定的销量就能够降低支付给高销售能力分销商的信息租金。文章从供应链中逆向选择与道德风险共存的角度对供应链委托代理关系进行研究,得出结论为供应链中的委托代理双方提供了一定的决策依据。

英文摘要：

In this paper,the agent discrimination and the design of effort incentive mechanism made by manufacturer are analyzed in two-stage supply chain which composed by a manufacturer and a distributor in the case that both adverse selection problem before the signing of the contracts and moral hazard problem after the signing of the contracts both are existed. The conclusion shows that：①Manufacturer can incentive distributor to devote optimal lever of effort through the way of effort revenue sharing,then to avoid moral hazard behaviors. ② Manufacturer can discriminate the type of distributor through the way of designing a group of incentive compatible mechanism,but the Manufacturer must pay some rent to the distributor with a high sales ability. ③The sale lever of distributor with a high sales ability will not be distorted,but the sale lever of distributor with a low sales ability will be distorted toward down,and the reason is the sale lever of distributor with a low sales ability which be designed by the manufacturer reduce can lead to that the rent which be paid to the distributor with a high sales ability reduce. This paper studied principal-agent relationship in supply chain in the view of adverse selection problem and moral hazard problem both exist in supply chain,and the conclusion provided some decision basis for both principal and agent.