中文摘要：

利用委托代理模型比较分析了委托代理双方在对称信息和不对称信息下南水北调东线工程水资源配置效率情况,结果表明：在对称信息下,南水北调东线工程水资源的配置效率达到最优,而在不对称信息下,次优的契约存在着交易量的扭曲（与最优契约相比）,并且对于具有效率的代理人,委托人必须给付其严格正的信息租金.为了改善南水北调东线工程水资源配置效率,尽可能减少高效率供水部门的信息租金,提出了南水北调东线工程水管理组织结构扁平化、引入市场机制、引入用水户参与机制等管理策略.

英文摘要：

The principal-agent model was employed to analyze two parties＇ water resources allocation efficiency with symmetric and asymmetric information. The results show that the allocation efficiency for water resources of the Eastern Route of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project is optimal with symmetric information, while there is a distortion of the transaction volume in the sub-optimal contract （compared with the optimal contract） with asymmetric information. Furthermore, the principals should pay information rent to the efficient agents. In order to improve the water resources allocation efficiency of the Eastern Route of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project, the information rent of efficient water-supply departments should be reduced as much as possible. Some management strategies are proposed for the Eastern Route of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project： the fiat management organization structure, the introduction of the market mechanism, and the introduction of the mechanism of water users＇ participation.