中文摘要：

根据163份有效问卷的数据分析表明，企业内部的财权配置与经营权配置之间存在负相关关系，企业规模和财务状况对财权配置有系统性影响，企业规模越大越倾向于分权，企业财务状况越好越倾向于分权。因此，我们不能笼统地用集权与分权来看待管理控制体系，经营上的分权并不排除财务上的集权。本文的发现对管理控制系统特别是企业集团母子公司关系的处理具有重要的指导意义。

英文摘要：

The analysis of the data from 163 valid questionnaires indicates that there exists a negative correlation between the configuration of financial fight and the configuration of operating right inside the enterprise. The business scale and financial position have some systemic effect on the configuration of financial right, the larger the business scale and the better the financial position, the greater the tendency to separate powers. Therefore, we can not treat the enterprise management and controlling system simply in terms of centralization and decentralization, the decentralization of operating right does not rule out the centralized financial rights. The findings of this paper is of great significance in guiding the treatment of the management controlling system, in particular the treatment of the relationship between parent and subsidiary companies within the enterprise group.