中文摘要：

为了抑制代理人的机会主义行为,委托人在设计激励机制时采用了报酬方案和棘轮效应。对实验数据进行分析发现：在预算目标能完成时,松驰诱导报酬方案下的业绩与真实诱导报酬方案下的业绩无显著差异;除了合约开始和结束这两个期间之外,预算合约中,在松驰诱导报酬方案下,棘轮效应对预算责任人的实际业绩有负面影响;在低估自己的能力时,真实诱导报酬方案下,棘轮效应会对实际业绩有积极作用。

英文摘要：

This paper focus on how reward plan and budget ratchet to affect performance of agent,Based on the data from experiment,we found.When budget can be full achieved,the performance of agent has no significant difference under truth inducing reward plan and slack inducing reward plan;except for begging and end period,when slack inducing reward plan existing,budget ratchet affect performance of agent negatively;when agent under-estimate his capability,and truth inducing reward plan existing,budget ratchet affect performance of agent positively.