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中文摘要：
将中外铁矿石价格谈判看做生物学意义上的演化博弈，国内钢铁企业和国外铁矿石出口商分别作为一个种群通过试错不断调整自身策略，通过演化博弈分析得到如下结论：演化稳定均衡的实现不仅取决于初始条件，还与制度层面的因素密切相关，行业协会的介入将使谈判双方都选择不妥协的概率增加，而如果政府实施的优惠政策与限制措施比较适度，则有利于谈判双方朝合作的方向演化。
英文摘要：
Chinese and foreign iron ore price negotiation is seen as the evolutionary game in the view of biological. Chinese iron firms and foreign iron exporters are taken as a species adjust their behaviors through trial and error constantly. The conclusion is drawn from evolutionary game analysis that the realization of evolutionary stable equilibrium is not only depends on initial conditions, but also closely relate to the factor of system level, the involvement of industry associations will increase the probability of uncompromising which negotiating parties choose, and if preferential policies and restrictions is implemented suitably bv the Government. it will benifit the negotiating parties towards the direction of co-evolution.
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