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中文摘要：
本文以1997-2008年间300家国有控股上市公司为例,采用多元logit模型考察了政府控制下的高管更换决策机理及其经济后果。研究发现,在政府控制的情况下,高管非升迁更换确实与公司业绩之间存在显著的负相关关系,但升迁更换与公司业绩之间并不存在显著的正相关关系。此外,在业绩相同的情况下,有政府背景的高管比较容易获得升迁,在控股股东中地位较高或具有人大、政协等政治资格的高管则不太容易发生非升迁更换。从市场反应来看,政府控制下的这种高管更换机制往往得不到市场的积极认可。
英文摘要：
Using the sample of 300 State-controlled listed companies from 1997 to 2008 and the multi-logit regression model,this paper examines executive turnover decision mechanism and its economic consequences in SOE.We find that,in SOE,the non-promotion of executives has significant negative relationship with economic performance,but the promotion of executives does not have significant positive relationship with it.On the contrary,the government background of executives has positive effect on their promotion,the position in parent company and political qualificaitions will help them to avoid non-promotion turnover.From market reaction perspective,this kind of executive turnover mechanism in SOE is not considered by market as positive governance behavior.
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